Environmental Defense Institute

Troy, Idaho 83871-0220

January 3, 2004

Review of the High-level Waste Tank

Closure Plans for INEEL

Environmental Defense Institute (EDI) offers this review of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) Idaho Nuclear Technology and Environmental Center (INTEC) mixed high-level radioactive and hazardous waste tank closure plan for tank numbers (WM-182-183-184-185-186) approved by Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (IDEQ) Docket Number 10HW0204 and 10HW-0314, EPA ID No. ID4890008952.

EDI and David McCoy filed more than six petitions to the State of Idaho and various branches of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over the last two years to "Revoke INEEL INTEC tank closure permits." None of these formal requests apparently resulted in any substantive response to the essential issues of compliance with Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) or Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). For a complete listing and access to these and related supplemental submittals see EDI's website at:
http://www.environmental-defense-institute.org/publications

Given the recent U.S. District Court judgement in NRDC vs. DOE, Case No. 01-CV.413 (BLW), the HWMA/RCRA Partial Closure Plan Permit for Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Complex (INTEC) WM-182 and WM-183 and Closure Plan for WM-184, 185, and 186 Tank Systems must be revoked. In addition to Judge Winmill's decision in the above cited case, we previously offered in formal submittals, NRDC's August 22, 2002 legal analysis letter to DOJ/DOE to substantiate our request. We note that the reason the NRDC suit was filed is to prevent precisely the type of tank closure that DOE is initiating and which IDEQ has authorized. More recently, IDEQ approved a preliminary closure plan for three additional tanks, INTEC HLW tanks WM-184, 185, and 186 with notice in the Federal Register dated 11/14/03 (the subject of these comments).

Therefore, EDI again renews our formal request that the above permit(s) for INTEC HLW Tank Closures be revoked. Judge Winmill's Memorandum Decision states: "Thus, DOE's Order 435.1 must be declared invalid under Chevron. The Court will therefore grant NRDC's motion for summary judgement and deny DOE's cross motion [for dismissal]." ⁽¹⁾ Moreover, given Judge Winmill's decision, the DOE's INEEL High-level Waste Final Environmental Impact Statement (September 2002) must be considered inadequate and obsolete because most of the selected waste management operations are now by court order illegal. Therefore the EIS must be updated and resubmitted for public comment.

EDI acknowledges receipt of IDEQ letters (4/16/02) and (5/22/02) to EDI, however IDEQ chose to characterize these requests solely as "Public Information Requests" and categorically ignore the fundamental request of the tank closure permit request. Below is a review of DOE documentation on the contents of the subject INTEC HLW tank contents.

Below is a table showing what limited information is available to EDI only as a result of several Public Information Requests to the State of Idaho, and not generally available to the public, and Freedom of Information Act requests to DOE.

Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center
Tank Farm Facility High-level Waste

The final INEEL HLW/EIS ⁽⁴⁾ puts the INTEC HLW (high-level waste) tank heels at between 5,000 and 20,000 gallons per tank, and makes no commitment to exhume the tank heels,

only liquids extractable using existing jet pumps located 9.5 inches above the tank floor. ⁽⁵⁾ Given that all of the above eleven tanks are fifty feet in diameter, 9.5 inches of waste amounts to about 11,620.3 gallons. ⁽⁶⁾ At the EIS's upper limit of 20,000 gallons of heels in each of the eleven INTEC HLW tanks (a more reasonably conservative estimate), the total volume for all eleven tanks could be 220,000 gallons.

This conservative estimate of tank heel volume is especially pertinent given the presence of coolant coils in eight of the eleven Tank Farm HLW tanks that are about two feet above the bottom of the tanks. ⁽⁷⁾ See DOE's "Construction Photo of HLW Tank Interior" that offers a clear relational perspective of the tank coolant coil height and extensive matrix. ⁽⁸⁾ This is a complex system of about forty individual coolant lines (each with individual tank penetration points) for each tank. ⁽⁹⁾ The photo shows the coolant lines on about one foot centers and two feet above the tank floor which would contain a volume at that level of about 29,360 gallons assuming a fifty-foot tank diameter.

Extraction of the ~ 29,360 gallons of tank heels in each tank or a total for the eight tanks with cooling coils of about 234,880 gallons without dedicated equipment capable of dislodging and exhuming the heels bound up in the cooling coils and related support structures, is extremely problematic. Again, DOE has made no binding commitment for any dedicated heel extraction equipment only utilizing existing jet pumps for the liquid contents above the 9.5 inch level.

For general discussion purposes the eight INTEC HLW tank heel totals (with cooling coils) at ~ 234,880 gallons (29,360 times eight) and three tanks at minimum heel volume of 11,620 gallons each (assuming a pump level of 9.5 inches) could leave potentially amount to about 289,500 gallons of high-level tank heels permanently in place under DOE's tank closure plans. ⁽¹⁰⁾

There are about 145 additional (not including the eleven Tank Farm units listed above) INTEC HLLW tanks (part of the INTEC Liquid Waste Management System ILWMS) with volume capacity of more than 440,000 gallons of waste that may also be left and grouted in place in DOE closure plans. ⁽¹¹⁾ To date, DOE has not disclosed any comprehensive assessment of these 145 additional tanks, or their liquid waste and heel volumes. There is however some limited information on the activity content of some operations. For instance the New Waste Calcine Facility (NWCF) will retain 8,610 curies and the Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE) will retain 7,768 curies (decayed to 2016) after closure. [DOE/EIS-0287D (1999) pages C.9-9] Again, as discussed below, these figures are considered to be significantly understated.

Idaho Department Environmental Quality (IDEQ) approved closure plan for WM-182 & 183 in July 2003. The closure plan was approved (11/14/03) by IDEQ (Docket # 10HW-0314) for INTEC HLW tanks WM-184, 185, 186 that will be finalized 12/03. The same basic regulatory issues and alleged violations apply to both closure plans as discussed below.

The completed closure of the Waste Calcine Facility at INTEC demonstrates how DOE is proceeding to close other operations (in addition to the Docket Number 10HW-0314, HLW tanks) by grouting them in place. It must be noted that these (as well as the HLW tanks) are not a Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) compliant "clean closure" but a negotiated "performance-based" deal with the State of Idaho that would not otherwise meet regulatory requirements under RCRA or the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). "This DOE closure is designed to remove radionuclides to the extent technically and economically practicable. The quantity of radionuclides that can remain as residual in the tank system is based on performance assessments." ⁽¹²⁾ Also see alleged non-compliant closure of INTEC SFE-20 tank closures containing HLW.

Since INEEL started operations over five decades ago, "reprocessing of reactor fuel generated approximately 10 million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste, with more than 50 million curies of radioactivity." ⁽¹³⁾ This represents a volume to radioactivity relational rate of 1 to 5 (liquid to curie). Internal INEEL documents put the tank radioactive content at 40 curies/gallon. ⁽¹⁴⁾ If applied as a crude ball park to current activity level of the eleven INTEC HLW Tanks listed above would yield an activity curie content of about forty or fifty million curies, or many orders of magnitude more than what DOE and the State of Idaho are acknowledging to the general public. More importantly the tank closure plan does not include this level of residual waste.

The radioactivity contained in the other 145 ancillary tanks in the INTEC Liquid Waste Management System, discussed above, is not appropriately included in the tank closure plan risk assessment for the whole INTEC site. Therefore, the risk-based closure plan is fundamentally flawed on numerous crucial factors.

This represents an enormous amount of radioactivity that DOE the state intend to leave permanently in the Big Lost River flood zone and above the Snake River Plain Aquifer. To put these radioactivity levels into perspective with respect to their deadly nature, EPA's drinking water standards for these radionuclides are in units of pico curies per liter or one trillionth of one curie.

Tank heels contain significantly higher radioactivity content than the liquid portion especially with respect to heavy long-lived transuranic elements like plutonium, uranium, and neptunium that tend to settle out into the tank heels. ⁽¹⁵⁾ DOE claims that the tanks undergoing closure do not contain high-level waste, yet up until 1997 they received first cycle raffinate (unrefuted as a high-level waste) which means the dominate tank heels will contain HLW. Moreover, the extensive ongoing use at INEEL of high-level liquid waste (HLLW) evaporators that burn off excess liquid containing volatile hazardous (i.e. mercury) and radioactive (i.e. tritium and C-14) portions of the waste to the atmosphere, means the current residual tank waste will have an even higher concentration of the non-volatile radioactive (i.e. plutonium) and hazardous waste constituents (i.e. cadmium, chromium, and lead). ⁽¹⁶⁾

Internal INEEL reports (see previous EDI submittals to EPA/IOG on internal INEEL reports on tank closure) confirm that grout when dumped into the tank does not mix with the residual tank waste, nor does it flow underneath the tank heels as DOE claims in its publications. Additionally, grout dumped into the tank vault between the tank and concrete vault does not flow underneath the tank as DOE claims. Therefore, the waste Risk Calculation "fate-transport" model assumptions used by DOE to show impact of waste migration on Snake River Aquifer are not credible because (among other reasons) they do not include residual waste. ⁽¹⁷⁾ Moreover, this inability to fully mix grout with the residual tank heel waste and test the resulting mixture for homogeneity and resistence to waste leachate, is a violation of RCRA clean closure standards. ⁽¹⁸⁾ DOE's EIS "assumed grout failure" in the risk assessment at 500 years, which is ludicrous given the toxic hazardous half-life (tens-of-thousands of years) of constituent radionuclides in the tank heels, and the fact that toxic heavy metals have no half-life. ⁽¹⁹⁾ As previously discussed, long-half-life decay "daughter" products (with even longer half-lives) of radionuclides in the tank heels is not included in the tank risk assessment closure plans. DOE can not claim a credible risk assessment without including the entire "decay chain" for each radionuclide contaminate and the perpetual time this waste will continue to migrate into the aquifer.

DOE/ID's INTEC HLW tank closure plan includes "landfill" rationale. ⁽²⁰⁾ This, in view of the recent Federal Court ruling in NRDC vs. DOE, is patently illegal. INTEC and the subject HLW tanks (the bottoms of which are some 40 feet below the flood level) are within the Big Lost River 100-year flood plain and therefore do not meet RCRA, NRC or NWPA criteria as a permanent disposal site for high-level waste. ⁽²¹⁾

Additionally, EDI requests, in view of the court ruling, a review of the IDEQ INEEL INTEC tank closure permits related to INTEC tanks WM-182 and 183 closure (Docket # 10HW-0204) and INTEC SFE-20 tank closure permit (Docket # 10HW-0203), and IDEQ Closure Permit for the INTEC Waste Calcine Facility [Docket # 10HW0305] and related tanks containing high-level waste as defined by the 7/3/03 U.S. District Court Decision that states in pertinent part: "... the solids sink to the bottom, forming a sludge, leaving the liquids on top. This physical separation is analogous to the NWPA's definition for separation: The liquid and solids are treated differently by the Act. While NWPA allows DOE to treat the solids to remove fission products, thereby permitting reclassification of the waste, NWPA does not offer the option of reclassification for liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing." ⁽²²⁾ Judge Winmill's decision therefore applies to all INEEL tanks containing high-level waste. The wastes that are from reprocessing are not to be left in any of the tanks at INEEL and merely grouted.

EDI further notes that the NRDC vs DOE decision must be applied to the tanks (as previously noted) associated with the Waste Calcine Facility ("WCF"), the New Waste Calciner Facility ("NWCF"), including but not limited to the Calciner itself and the tanks for the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator, Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE), Liquid Effluent Treatment Disposal (LET&D), and other INTEC Liquid Waste Management System tanks. The contents of these tanks should be slated for RCRA clean closure and waste removal from the state of Idaho and not allowed to enter into the ongoing CERCLA process of INEEL onsite burial.

For more information contact:
Chuck Broscious, Executive Director
Environmental Defense Institute, P. O. Box 220
Troy, ID 83871-0220 208-835-5407 edinst@tds.net
INEEL\ICPP Tanks\Tank Closure Review.5

Endnotes:

1. U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, Natural Resources Defense Council, et al, v. Spencer Abraham, Secretary, Dept. of
     Energy,  Civ.  No. 01-0413-S-BLW, Memorandum Decision, July 3, 2003, page 12. Hereinafter referred to as NRDC v. DOE.
2. Salt Lake Tribune October 19,2003, Associated Press story "Idaho wants support in reclassifying liquid waste."
3. Idaho High-level Waste and Facilities Disposition, Final Environmental Impact Statement, September 2002, page C.9-37, referred hereafter as DOE/EIS-0287.
4. DOE/EIS-0287, page 2-14.
5. DOE/EIS-0287 page 2-14 and DOE/ID-10802, 12/20/00, pg A-19
6. It is a credible assumption to put the minimum amount of waste in each of the tank bottoms at 11,620 gallons since only the existing
        jet  pumps are used. Therefore, the above table listing DOE heel volumes of only 5,000 gallons of tank heels must be considerably
          understated by about 6,620 (11,620 - 5,000) gallons per tank or an additional 33,100 gallons for those five tanks listed at only 5,000 gallons.
7. Idaho Hazardous Waste Management Act/Resource Conservation Recovery Act Closure Plan for Idaho Nuclear Technology and
        Engineering Center Tanks WM-182 and WM-183, DOE/ID-10802, November 2001, page 2.
8. INEEL, Status and Path Forward for Treatment of INTEC Sodium-Bearing Waste, Joel Case and Keith Lochie DOE/ID 1/14/2003,
           presentation, that includes a man standing at the bottom of a HLLW tank among coolant coils.
9. INTEC Tank Farm Facility Closure VES-WM-182 Plan View, page 27, and VES-183, page 28, DOE/ID-10802 Revision 0.
10. Assumptions in this "general purpose discussion" are; 1.) tank diameter is 50 feet; 2.) cooling coils are about two feet above the
        bottom of the tank based on the cited photo depiction of the tank interior; 3.) there are eight tanks with cooling coils as stated in
       DOE/ID-10802 page 2; 4.) the remaining three HLW tanks do not contain coolant coils and the existing jet pumps are 9.5 inches above
        the bottom of the tank as previously cited in DOE/ID-10802.
11. See EDI Tank List Report on INTEC Liquid Waste Management System, Rev, 13, 11/17/03.
12. DOE/ID-10802, Revision 0, page 12.
13. Affidavit of Kathleen Trever, State of Idaho Coordinator-Manager for INEEL Oversight, 3/24/03, in NRDC v. DOE.
14. DOE's own tank closure plan (not readily available to the general public) also notes activity level as high as 40 curies per gallon.
         [DOE/ID-10802, 11/01, page 5]
15. INEEL/EXT-01-00666, Revision 2, August 2002, page 47.
16. Sampling and Analysis Plan for the Post Decontamination Characterization of WM-182 and WM-183 Tank Residuals,
        INEEL/EXT-01-0066 Rev 2, 8/02, page 44
17. DOE/ID-10802, 12/20/00, pg. B-2]
18. See 40 CFR 264.111 and 265.111and 40 CFR 268.48 Toxic Characteristics Leachate Procedure (TCLP) that also mandates the final
      waste form must contain contaminates verified by sampling to validate RCRA permit requirements. None of these requirements are
         being met at INEEL's grouting of high-level waste.
19. DOE/EIS-0287, page C.9-37.
20. DOE/ID-10841, December 2000.
21. See 40 CFR 270.14, 264.8 and 265.18 prohibitions in 100 year flood plains.
22. See Note # 1, page 10.